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and NEER I. Introduction 
A  by-product of the debate leading up  to  the  Tax Reform Act  of 1986 
(TRA86)  was a sharpened  focus on the interrelationship  between  taxation at the 
federal level  and  at  the  state  and  local  level.  The  particular  issue 
sharpening  the  focus was the proposed  elimination  of federal  deductibility for 
all  state and local taxes.  Governors expressed grave concern over  the 
possibility that  ending federal  deductibility  would create pressure on state 
officials  to  lower  taxes.  One  could  hear  regular  forecasts  of  dire 
consequences for  state  and municipal programs as  taxes would  have  to be 
lowered.  After  considerable political  maneuvering,  the  deduction  was 
eliminated only  for general sales taxes  when the 1986  tax law was  finally 
enacted.  Economists  and many state  officials predicted a decteased reliance 
on  the general  sales  tax as a result. 
To the surprise  of many analysts, it appears  that  states  have not reduced 
their reliance on the sales  tax;  the tax continues to be an important source 
of  revenue  for states  and in  many states  is actually  increasing  in importance. 
Why were the predictions  so far from the mark?  Were the  economists and their 
models wrong?  Or have  state legislators  and governors responded incorrectly 
to the new economic  environment  resulting  from TRA86? 
On a broader level,  how do state governments  alter state tax policy when 
federal tax  policy changes?  How should these  governments  respond?  In this 
paper, I  review economic  models of state tax structure  which incorporate the 
exporting of state  taxes  both  to  the  federal government through  federal 
deductibility and to non-residents through non-resident consumption, labor 
supply,  and business activity in the state.  Economic models  of state  tax 
structure can be helpful on two levels.  First,  they can provide predictions 
for how stare tax  policy will change in response ro changes in federal tax 
policy.  These predictions  may be helpful to  stare  policy  makers  as  they 
1 adjust  their tax structure  to  maintain balanced  budgets  in response  to changes 
in federal tax policy.  The predictions  may also be useful to federal policy 
makets.  Changes in federal  tax  policy clearly  have effects  on state and local 
governments; empirical  work  such  as  is  presented in  this  paper  helps  to 
quantify the magnitudes of  these  effects.  In effect,  empirical  results may 
provide a benchmark estimate  of  how large a response in tax structure  may be 
expected  as a result of changes in the economic environment  facing  the state. 
Second, models  can provide guidelines for  how  state  policy makers  would 
respond to changes in federal tax policy if they maximized the welfare of 
residents  of  their  states.  The guidelines suggest  how state officials should 
take into account the degree of exporting of state taxes,  the distribution  of 
income  within  a  state and other  factors as they attempt to construct an 
optimal  mix of  taxes for their own state. 
After reviewing models,  I then analyze data on  state tax  structure for 
fiscal  yeats 19g0 through l9B to answer some of the  questions posed above. 
Specifically, I  investigate  how  state tax structures respond to changes in 
federal  tax policy  and other economic  variables.  I  then consider  the  response 
of  the  sales tax in mote  detail.  Is the sales tax different  from  other taxes? 
Can we extrapolate  from the  experience  of ending  deductibility  for  this  tax to 
what we  would  expect if deductibility  were eliminated for all taxes?  This 
last question is of particular importance  as the federal  government looks for 
ways  to  reduce  the  federal  deficit during a period when many  states  ate 
experiencing  severe  fiscal  distress. 
II.  Background 
Economists hsve long recognized that  the ability to export taxes  to out 
of state taxpayers should  sffect the  choice of  tax instruments.  For example, 
Timothy  Hogan  and  Robert  Shelton  (1973)  present  a  model  where  a  local 
government attempts to maximize tax collections  from out of state taxpayers. 
2 Similarly,  Richard  Arnotr  and Ronald  Grieson (1981)  present  a  model of  optimal 
tax policy  when interatate  tax exporting  is possible.  Neithet  of  these papers 
considers the  opportunities for exporting taxes  to  the  federal  government 
through  federal tax  deductibility1.  With the proposals  in Ttemsuty I  and II 
to  eliminate  the  federal  deduction  for  state  and  local  tax  payments, 
economists shifted  their  attention to measuring how altering deductibility 
would  affect  atate  and  local  government  spending  and  choice  of  tmx 
instruments2. 
Based  on the  research described above,  most  economists  predicted  a 
decreasing  reliance  on  the general sales  tax after TRA86 as this  was the only 
tax Lot which deductibility  was removed.  In  Metcalf  (1990)  ,  I  discusa the 
predictions by economists and note  that  there does not  appear  to  be  any 
perceptible  movement away from the use of sales taxation.  Paul Courant and 
Edward Ctamlich (1990)  also note this  in a review of  the impact of  TR.A86 on 
state and local fiscsl  behavior. 
Thete are two competing  theories  for  why the sales tax share did not fall 
as expected.  The first theory  follows from the average tex price literature 
of  the 1980s  and will be termed the "incomplete  deductibility"  theory.3  The 
aecond theoty  follows  from a theory  of tax distribution  and political interesç 
groups.  In  the next section,  I describe  those two models in  some detail. 
Before turning to a closer consideration  of the two models,  it  may be 
useful to consider how  the collection of revenues  at the state  level has 
changed  over the past decade.  Figures  1  and 2 show the relative importance  of 
the  Live major tax instruments  that ate  used by  state  governments for the 
years 1978 through  l988.  The graphs  show that personal income  taxes and 
general  sales taxes  became more important as  sources of revenue over  this 
petiod.  This teflects  a longer term trend  in which these sources of revenue 
became more  important  as selective sales  and corporate income tax collections declined in importance.  In addition,  Figute 1  illustrates  the importance of 
the  Tax Reform Act of l98i on personal income  tax collections  in fiscal yeat 
1987.  Theta  is  a one  time  increase  of  over 1%  of personal income  tax 
collections due  to  the  windfall  affect  with  a corresponding .4%  drop  in 
general sales tax collections  as a fraction  of the  total.  In constructing  a 
theory of how TRA86 affected state  tax  structure,  it is important  to keep in 
mind the trend toward  greater use of personal income  and general sales taxes 
during the 1980a.  That general sales  tax collections  increased  as a fraction 
of taxes and currant  charges after Tax Reform  may perhaps  ha explained quite 
simply by the explanation that they would  have  grown even  faster  in the 
absence  of  reform. 
III.  A  Model of the Choice  of  State Tax Rates 
In this section,  I describe a basic tax price model of the choice of 
state  tax  rates  which  takes  into  account exporting both  to  the  federal 
government through  deductibility  and to non-residents  who either  work or make 
purchases within the state.5  The model posits a state government  maximizing 
the  utility  of  a  representative individual  (resident).  There  is  also 
consumption  and labor supply  by  non-resident  individuals  about whom the state 
is not concerned (except  for their tax revenue  potential)  .  Individuals take 
prices as given and maximize utility over labor supply,  a taxable commodity 
and a non-taxable commodity.  The government maximizes the  indirect utility 
function of  the  resident  subject to  a  government budget  constraint  that 
expenditures not  exceed  taxes  collected from residents and non-residenta. 
Choice  variables for the government  are  the two tax  rates,  one on wage income 
and the other a sales tax rate on  the taxable  commodity. 
A key concept in this  model is that  of  a "tax price".  An example  will 
illustrate the concept.  Consider a  taxpayer in  a  50%  federal  tax bracket 
living in  a  state  with a state income  tax.  Let us assume  that she  pays $1000 in state personal income  taxes.  She can then take this  $1000 in state taxes 
as  a  deduction  on her federal  return.  The $1000 deduction  reduces  her federal 
tax liability  by $500 (.50 x $1000).  Thus her rg.fl  state tax liability after 
taking  federal deductibility  into account is only $500.  Put differently,  the 
price of a dollar of state taxes  is  one  minus her federal marginal tax rate 
and in this example  equals  so.6 
The model provides the nut surprising  result that  increasing  the  federal 
tax price  for the state sales  (income)  tax induces the state to decrease 
(increase)  its  sales  tax rate and inctease (decrease) its  income tax tate. 
The result is not surprising  assuming that state policy makers are  attempting 
to  maximize the  welfare of residents. Whether policy makers  maximize  resident 
welfare or not,  comments by many  state  lawmakers and governors during  the 
debate  leading  up to  TRA86 suggested  that they well understood the sensitivity 
of tax structure to changes in tax prices.  This inverse  relationship  between 
tax price  and tax share provides the  formal motivation for the tax price 
literature of  the  mid l980s in which researchers estimated demand equations 
for state and local  tax shares as  functions of the tax price of these state 
and local level  taxes. 
Next,  I consider  the effects  of  the  Tax Reform Act of  1986 on  the choice 
of tax rates.  There were two major changes in TRAS6 which affected tax prices 
for state and local  taxes:  fitst,  marginal  tax rates were lowered  for most tax 
payers.  This  rate reduction  had the effect of reducing the value of  federal 
deductions,  including  deductions for state and local  taxes. 
Above,  I  considered an example of  a  taxpayer in  a  50%  federal tax 
bracket.  Now consider a tax reform  which  reduces her federal marginal tax 
tate  to  28%.  She  still  pays $1000 in  state  income taxes  and still takes a 
$1000  deduction on her federal return.  But now the reduction in her federal 
tax liability is only $280 (.28 x $1000)  and her net state tax liability is 
5 now $720.  her tax price for state  income  tmxes  has  increased  from .50 to  .72. 
Lower marginal tax rates  redoce the value  of all deductions; in our 
example,  the  tax price of a dollar of state taxes has been  increased.  But 
TRA86 also eliminated  the  deduction  for the sales tax (thereby  increasing  its 
tax  price to 1: A dollar of  sales  tax  now costs  the  taxpayer a full  dollar). 
However,  for most taxpayers,  the general  sales tax deduction  is generated from 
tables  based on data from the Consumer  Expenditure  Survey (Feenberg  and Rosen 
(1986)  describe the  IRS methodology  in more  detail).  While there is no hard 
evidence  on  this  matter,  there  is widespread  belief  among tax experts that rhe 
tables  significantly  underestimate the general sales tax liability actually 
incurred  by  individuals7. 
If there  is incomplete  deductibility  of sales taxes  prior to 1986,  then 
it is no  longer  clear  that  the sales tax rate will  fall after  198g.  The 
intuition is  straightforward.  Take a polar case where the sales tax tables 
essentially  give no deduction fur state sales taxes.  Then  the federal tax 
price for state sales taxes  equals  une prior to and after Tax Reform and the 
only price change is an increase  in the  tax price for income  taxes as federal 
marginal  tax rates  fall.8 
The  interaction between  exporting  to  the  federal government  through 
deductibility  and to non-residents is slightly more complicated.  Analyzing 
the two polar exporting cases  provides the clearest insight.  If there is no 
exporting  of taxes at all (either  of the sales  tax or the personal income tax) 
then the sales  tax  rate can increase  or decrease  depending on the degree of 
incomplete  deductibility.  However,  in the case  of complete exporting of the 
sales tax and no exporting of the incoae  tax,  then the  sales  tax rate is 
unambiguously  reduced after TRABS.  This is perhaps surprising as one might 
have imagined  that the  increase in the  income tax  price would have induced a 
shifting  away free the income  tax and toward  the  sales  tax.  The intuition for 
g the  result  is  quite  straightforward however.  In  the  case  of  complete 
exporting, the state acts as a monopolist in  setting  its  sales tax rate to 
maximize tax revenue from non-residents.  An increase in the  gross price of 
the  taxable commodity  to non-residents  requires  an  offsetting  decrease in the 
sales tax rate to maintain the gross price at its revenue maximizing level. 
The degree to which the income  tax rate falls  relative to the sales tax rate 
depends on several factors.  In  particular,  it falls by  a greater amount the 
larger the sales tax base is relative to the income  tax base and the larger 
labor supply  elasticities  are relative  to  demand elasticities. 
Summarizing,  it  is  quite possible that sales tax rates might increase 
after  TRA8G.  In  addition,  states  with a  high degree  of  sales tax exporting  may 
be jg  likely to  increase the sales tax rate.  This runs counter to the 
intuition of many economists who would have expected exporting to act as a 
"safety  valve" for states.  However, this  model suggests  that states  must take 
care not to  jeopardize their non-resident  revenues. 
The  virtue of  the model sketohed out shove is that  it integrates for the 
first time  the two  types of exporting of state  snd local taxes.  Many of the 
results  are  not  surprising upon  a  hit  of  reflection,  particularly  that 
incomplete deductibility of  sales taxes at the federal level might  in fact 
have reduced substantially the  degree to which  the  price for general sales 
taxes increased  after  TRAB6.  However  the complicated  interaction  between  the 
two types of exporting  has not been well understood  nor has it been adequately 
treated in the literature. 
The model described above is an "average"  tax price aodel as it models 
state  tax  structure  policy as a  function  of one particular tax price,  the 
average tax  price  of  all  residents in  the  state.  It  is  a  variant  on 
"decisive" voter models of tax policy which identify a  particular resident 
(median,  typically) 
.  An  alternative  model  recognizes  that  state  tax policies reflect  a balancing  of interests  among different income  groups.  Robert Inman 
(1989)  provides  an explanation  of the  increase in the  reliance on sales tsxes 
since TRA86 based on  such s model.  The elimination  of  federal deductibility 
of sny tax increases  the tax burden on weslthier taxpayers more  since this 
group is more likely  to itemize  deductions on their federal return.  Assuming 
that state tax structure  was constructed  to achieve  a distributional balance 
among different  income  groups prior to TRA86,  states  will wish to shift taxes 
from wealthier tax payers to lower income  tax payers after TRA86.  Assuming 
that sales taxes fall more heavily on  the poor and income taxes more heavily 
on the  tich,  increasing the  share of taxes  coming  from  sales  taxes  and 
decreasing the share  from income taxes  will help regain the disttibutionsl 
balance upset by TRA86.9  In the  empirical  work that follows,  I  will try and 
shed  some  light  on which  of  these  competing theories best explains  the 
continued importance  of state sales taxes. 
IV.  Measurinc Tax Prices  for State and Local Taxes 
As noted shove,  if taxpayers  itemize their deductions on their federal 
income tax  and take  state (and  local)  rsxes as a deduction, the net cost of a 
dollar of  the  state tax is  reduced from 1  to  l-r,  where  r  is  the federal 
marginal tax rate  on income for the taxpayer.  Measuring the sppropriste tax 
rate  is not  straightforward  however.  For  example,  additional  state  tax 
deductions could reduce  taxable income sufficiently that  the  taxpayer is 
pushed into a lower  tax bracket.  In this case,  the  mmrginal tax rate is not 
the  rate  that  she  faced  prior  to  an  increase  in  state  tax  liability. 
Alternatively,  s taxpayer  may not have sufficient  deductions to make it worth 
her while to itemize  on her return.  In this case her tax price would appear 
to be one.  Mowever,  the additional state  taxes might be sufficient to make 
itemizing  worthwhile  in which case the  tax price is less than one.  These two 
examples illustrate  the  important sources  of feedback  from tax collections  to determination  of the tax prices.  In the  presence of this feedback, ordinary 
least squares  estimates of tax price coefficients in tax share regressions 
will be biased.  I will use an instrumental  variable approach to control for 
this simultaneity. These examples  also highlight the advantages of  using the 
NBER TAXSIM tax  calculator  to compute individual  tax prices.  TAXSIM is a set 
of Fortran routines  which  uses detailed data from the  IRS  Individual Tax 
Model1°  to  compute  the federal tax liability for individual tax returns. 
TAXSIM can  be  programmed  to  compute  marginal  tax  rates  by  computing  the 
additional  tax liability on an individual's tax return resulting  from  an 
additional  dollar  of  income.  For the purposes  of this study,  I impute to each 
return an additional  dollar of  state tax  deductions (for  any given tax)  and 
measure the  reduction  in federal  and state  tax liability.  The tax price (P1) 
equals one minus the reduction in  tax  liability.  The resulting tax price 
measure for returns  within a state can be averaged to estimate a state wide 
average  marginal tax  price for particular  taxes. 
There  are three  additional significant advantagea to using  TAXSIM  to 
measure tax prices.  First,  state tax codes are programmed  into  TAXSIM along 
with the  federal tax code.  While the  discussion in section III  assumed that 
only  state taxes  were deducted from federal taxes,  in actuality, 12 states 
allow a deduction for federal taxes  on  the incoae  tax11.  If federal income 
taxes  can be deducted  at the state level,  then the  taxprice for an itemizer 
becomes 
)  + r (1-v  )  * 
(1)  F'  —  1  -  F  • 1-v 
where  r  is  the  appropriate federal  marginal  tax  rate  and  r  the  appropriate 
state  tax rate.  Again,  TAXSIM  would simply  look at the change in  the overall 
tax liability  (r )  to determine the tax price. 
A  second advantage of using  TAXSIM  is that I  can construct different tax 
prices  for different  state taxes.  Tax prices may differ because of either 
9 changes in federal  deductibility  rules (e.g.  the less of deductibility  for the 
general  sales  tax  in  1986)  or differences in  state  deductibility.  With 
respect to the lstter,  some states allow deductibility  of state  income taxes 
but not state general  sales  taxes and vice versa.12 
A  final  advantage  of the TAXSIM  program is that I  can construct tax 
prices  for different  taxpayers  in  the  income  distribution  for each state.  One 
of the recurring controversies  in the tax  price literature  is over whose tax 
price  matters.  Is it the  Median Voter?  The Mean Voter?  The Rich Voter?  One 
problem  with the median  voter approach is that  the  taxpayer  with median income 
doesn't typically itemize at the federal  level.  In  this case,  altering the 
deductibility  rules should  have no impact on state tax  structure.  Feldstein 
and Metcalf  (1987)  argued that the mean voter is more appropriate due  to 
possibilities of log rolling and coalition  formation.  I  have used  TAXSIM to 
construct a panel of tax prices  for the  various states for different points 
along the income  dfstribution.  In the  regression work,  I  use  tax  price 
measures for different taxpayers in various income  groups to determine whose 
tax  price matters in  the final analysis.13 
V.  An Empirical  Analysis g  State Level 
In  this  section I  consider three questions:  1)  How  are  tax  shares 
affected  by changes  in tax prices?  2)  Do changes in tax prices affect sales 
tax rates and the  sales  tax base differently?  3)  Whose tax price matters? 
Table 1 gives summary information  on  the data used in the analysis.  The 
first six rows in table  1 show information  on different  taxes as fractions of 
personal income  across  the  48  continental states  from  fiscal  years  1980 
through 1988.14  As noted above,  personal income  taxes and general males tax 
revenue are  the two biggest  tax revenue sources,  followed by charges and 
licenses and selective males  tax revenue.  The next two variables are tax 
prices for  state personal income taxem end general males  taxes.  These were 
10 constructed  from TAXSIM as described above and ere net of federal end state 
taxes.  Across  the sample,  the  correlation  barween these  two tax prices  is 
0,57.15  The mean price for both is slightly  more than 91,  meaning that a $100 
increase  in state sales  tax  collections  has a coat net of taxes to taxpayers 
on  average  of $91. 
In addition to the  tax price variables, I  include  other  demographic 
variables in the regressions.  As a measure of the degree of exporting of 
stare general  sales  taxes,  I use the Sales  Activity Index as computed  by 
Marketing  Management  Mazazine.  This index measures the frattion of  sales 
within a  state relative to the aggregate  sales nationally and  scales  this 
fraction  by  the fraction  of national population  within a state.  Hence a high 
measure of the index indicates  a high degree of spending within  the state 
relative to the population of the state.  I  use this variable to measure 
non-resident  consumption  within  the state.16  In addition  to these variables I 
include an indicator  variable equaling  one if the state  collects taxes from a 
severance tax,  age  demographic  variables (fraction  of  population  between ages 
18 and 44 and fraction aged 65 and over),  and changes in  the  unemployment 
rate.  The severance  tax variable measures the degree  to which the state can 
rely on severance  tax collections. To the extent  that residents  perceive that 
severance taxes  are exported to non-residents,  this should lead to a reduced 
II!  reliance  on other taxes.  Residents  between ages 18 and 44 and older than 65 
are likely  to  have a high consumption  to income ratio and should prefer lower 
reliance on sales  taxation.  Shocks to  the  state's economy  (as  measured by 
changes in the  unemployment  rate)  will result in a  fall in tax collections 
whether collections  fall faster or  slower than income  is not clear a priori. 
I add a trend variable  and fixed effects  in the  share regressions  and dummies 
for  census  regions  in  the  rare  and  base  regressions  to  control  for 
macroeconomic  effects  and regional specific differences in  reliance on sales 
11 taxes.17 
Table 2  reports regression results  for six categories of taxes  as  a 
fraction of personal income.  The first two regressions  accord with  theory 
with respect  to the tax prices.  In the personal  income  regression,  the  income 
tax price effect  is  negative and strongly significant while  the  sales tax 
effect is positive and significant.  In the general  sales  tax regression,  the 
sales tax price effect is negative;  however the income tax price effect is 
also  negative.  Note  though  rhat  neither  estimate  is  statistically 
significant.  Moreover,  the  price  effect  in  the sales  tax  regression is 
economically  insignificant.  Eliminating  the  federal  deduction for either the 
state personal income  or general  sales tax would increase either  tax price by 
roughly g  percentage  points (from  92 to 100)  .  An  eight  point  increase  in the 
sales tax  price would imply a drop in sales tax collections  of .%.  An  eight 
point  increase  in  the  income  tax price,  on  the  other  hand,  would imply a drop 
in personal income tax collections of  34%.  This very  different response 
merits further  consideration;  one possible explanation  is that the use of the 
sales tax tables by most itemizers blunts  the marginal effect  to a  great 
extent. 
The average export effect for five out of six regressions is positive 
(the exception being  selective sales taxes);  moreover it is statistically 
significant  in three  of the six regressions.  The age group between 18 and 44 
in general would  like to see  less  taxes collected  (except  for the  other 
category) with the point estimate highest for the two  most visible  taxes  - 
personal  income and general  sales.  The  elderly on  the  other hand  prefer 
general  and  selective sales  taxes  along  with  charges and  licenses,  and 
corporate taxes to personal income and other  taxes.  These  results don't 
accord  with priors;  I  would have expected both these groups to prefer income 
to sales taxes.  Increases  in unemployment  lead to a fall in tax  collections 
12 relative to  income  in all categoriea suggesting that the tax revenues fall 
more sharply  than does  income. 
Overall, rhese  regressions  suggest that own price  effects are important 
for the  income  tax  but not for the aalea  tax.  This concluaion is supported  by 
the price effects  on other  taxes.  One  would think that increases in income  or 
sales  tax prices would lead to an increased reliance on some of the other 
taxes.  This effect is  found for the  income tax price in 3 of the 5  taxes 
(with  positive estimates  statistically  significant  in iwo cases).  However the 
sales  tax effect  on other  taxes  is  very  small,  more  often negative  than 
positive and only significant  in one regression (a case where the effect is 
negative). 
Why is  there such a small and often insignificant  effect of the sales tax 
price in the general  sales tax regressions? One possibility  is that the sales 
tax look up  tables  are perceived to have no effect at the margin.  Another 
(and not incompatible)  possibility is that state policy makers can react in 
different  dimensions to changes in the  tax price (or perceived tax price) in 
ways that offset each other.  To consider that possibility, I  decomposed the 
sales  tax regressions  into rate  and base coverage regressions.  For the rate 
measure,  I  used a weighted  average of the  sales tax rate at the beginning of 
the year and at the end,  weighted  by the month during the year in which the 
rate changed.  The base coverage  measure is constructed  in two steps.  First, 
I  construct a  measure  of  the  tax base  as the  ratio of general sales  tax 
revenues to the sales tax rate.  I  then divide this base measure by gross 
state product (GIP)  in the state.18  This variable measures the fraction of 
economic activity in the  state  included in the sales tax base.  It averages 
44% with a standard  deviation of 10 percentage  points.  I have not explicitly 
controlled  for the sample  selection  bias in the rate and base regressions  as I 
simply ignore states  with no general sales tax.  Given the small number of 
13 continental  statea  without a general aales  tax  sample selection bias is not 
likely to be a significant  problem.  Those results  are reported in Table 3. 
As expected,  the income  tax price coefficient is positive and significant in 
the  rate regression and  the  sales  tax price  coefficient is  negative  and 
significant. Exporting  appears to have no effect  on  rates. 
The surprising  result  is that  the  sales  tax price coefficient  is positive 
and  very  significant in  the base  regression while  the  income  tax  price 
coefficient is negative and significant.  A possible reason for this  result 
follows from the fact  that businesses pay a considerable amount of sales 
taxes.19  Stephen  Pollock (1991)  has noted that  businesses contribute as much 
as 45% to sales tax collections.  One possible response  to an increase in the 
sales tax  price is for states to broaden the base so as to tax more purchases 
made by businesses.  While some of  those  taxes will ultimately be paid by 
residents, either  through  higher  prices or lower factor  prices,  much of  these 
tsxes will likely  be exported  to non-residents. 
Finally,  I  turn to  the  question, "Whose  tax price matters?"  Feldstein 
and  Metcalf  (1987)  argued  that  an  average marginal  tax  price  was  the 
appropriate  price  reflecting  coalition  building  and  other  complicated 
interactions  in the political arena at  the  state level.  One might  take an 
interest  group approach (viz  Inman (1989))  and allow for prices of different 
income  groups  to  enter.  Tables 4 and  5  present two  different  sets  of 
regressions  to  shed some  light  on  this  issue.  In  table  4,  I  present 
regression  estimates  for  the personal income  tax  share and general sales tax 
share  regressions  along  the  lines  of  the  results  in  table  2.  These 
regressions differ  frots  those  in table  2  by  substituting tax prices  for 
returns in different adjusted gross income  percentiles for the average tax 
price (presented  in the  last column for comparison  purposes).  Whose tax price 
matters?  One crude way to answer the question is  to see which  estimated 
14 own-price effect coefficient  has the highest t statistic.  By this standard, 
the average marginal  tax price wins for  the income  tax regression  and the 
percentile wins for the  general sales tax  regression.  Limiting ourselves to 
the percentile regressions,  the  percentile (along  with the 90n1) is most 
important for the  personal income tax regressions  and the  75th  (and perhaps 
the 50th) percentile for the  general sales  tax regressions.  The cross price 
elasticities are less informatiw;  however it is interesting that  the one 
significant cross price  elasticity  occurs  in  the  75th  percentile  for  the 
general  sales tsx  regression  and has the correct  sign.  This approach suggests 
that high income groups are influential  with respect to the income tax and 
upper middle income  groups  with respect to the general  sales  tax. 
The personal income  regressions  also provide support for the large own 
price  elasticities implied by the income tax regressions  reported here  and 
also  reported by  Feldstein and  Metcalf  (1987).  For example,  the  price 
elasticity for the income  tax  regression in table 2  is -3.92.  Feldstein and 
Metcalf  argue  that  average  tax  price  elasticities are  likely  to  be 
substantially  greater  than  elasticities  of  decisive  voters  due  to  the 
combining of itemizers and  non-itemizers in the average tax price.  The 
estimated elasticities  for the income tax regression  support that story:  in 
all  cases,  the  estimated elasticities are  substantially  smaller than  that 
derived  from  the  average tax  price  regression.  If  the  95"  percentile 
taxpayer is  decisive,  the appropriate  elasticity is  -  .74,  about 20% of the 
elasticity from the  average  tax price regression. The two different  estimates 
lead to roughly  the same  drop in income  tax share in response to eliminating 
deductibility.  The mean personal income  tax share  in my sample is 18.3 while 
the average tax price for all taxpayers is 91.9 and for the  percentile 
taxpayer is 69.7.  Eliminating  deductibility  of the  income tax would mean an 
increase in the  tax  price of the  average taxpayer of 8.1  points 
15 (100-91.9)  and 30.3 points for  the  percentile  taxpayer.  The average tax 
price coefficient  of - .781  implies  a drop in income  tax collections  relative 
to personal income  of  .781  x  8.1  or 6.33 (a 34% drop)  while the estimated 
coefficient  ftom  the  percentile regression (-  .194)  implies  a drop of 
.194 x 30.3  or 5.88  (32%).  As this example shows,  large elasticities ftoa 
average  tax price regresaions  are consistent  with more  modest (and plausiblo) 
elasticities  from decisive  voter tax  price regressions. 
As  a second  cot at this question, table 5  presents regressions  in which I 
included  tax  prices  for  the  the  50th,  and  thm  95th  percentile 
taxpayers.20 The story for the  personal income  and general  sales taxes remains 
unchanged.  In the  personal income tax regression,  the own-price coefficient 
is negative and strongly  aignificant for  the 95  percentile.  The coefficient 
ia statistically  insignificant  for the 2S  percentile  and significant  but the 
wrong  sign  for the 50th  percentile.  Moreover,  the  sales  tax  coefficient 
(cross  price effect)  ia only positive (though  statistically  insignificant)  for 
the  95t  percentile.  For  the  general  males  tax  regression,  the  50tk 
percentile  has the correct sign and is statistically  significant  for the sales 
tax price  coefficient and is positive and significant for the  income  tax 
(cross  price)  coefficient.  Both  the  2S  and  95t  percentile coefficient 
estimates in  this  regression have  the wrong sign and are not statistically 
significant.  The results of these regressions  support the findings of  table. 
4: Tax prices of  high incoae groups  seem relevant  for the income tax  while tax 
prices of  middle income  groups  seem relevant  for the sales  tax. 
VI. Conclusion 
Policy makers at  the federal level might point to the  continuing strong 
reliance by  states  on  the  sales  tax and  argue  that  eliminating  federal 
deductibility for state and local  taxes will have no consequences for  the 
state and local  sector.  Results froa this analysis  suggest  otherwise.  While 
16 there is not a strong  response  ci sales tax share to changes in its  tax  price, 
there is a very strong (and statistically  significant)  response of  the income 
tax to changes in  its tax  price.  Eliminating  deductibility  would likely  cause 
a large shift in tax structure  away from taxes which had been deductible to 
taxes which continue  to be deductible  by  businesses. 
How then should  we explain  the  insignificant  response of sales  tax share 
to changes in  its  tax price?  In the end,  I  think both  the  "incomplete 
deductibility"  story and the disttibutional" story play a role.  There is a 
degree of responsiveness  of rates  to changes  in sales tax price (table  3) and 
some responsiveness of sales tax share  to changes in tax prices  of upper 
middle income groups (table 4).  These results suggest that the deduction 
generated from "look up" tables  is not entirely lump sum.  However, exporting 
concerns likely dampen  any desired  reductions in sales tax share in response 
to increases in sales tax price. 
However,  the regression  results  also lend some indirect support for the 
distributional  story of  Inman and others.  Different income groups appear to 
be concerned with different taxes:  upper income  groups for the income  tax and 
middle  to  upper  middle  income  groups  for  the  sales  tax.  Given  this 
differential set of concerns,  policy makers may  have chosen  to  rely more 
heavily on the sales  tax after TRA lo offset some of the gains  to lower 
income  groups  resulting  from tax reform. 
That different  income  groupa ate concerned about different taxes suggest 
a possible  benefit tax approach  as states  struggle to raise money for a wide 
variety of  important  services.  Linking  income  tax  revenues to  services 
benefiting high income  groups  and sales  tax revenues to  services benefiting 
lower and middle income  groups  may provide additional political support foc 
state tax systems  which increasingly  ere under attack from residents in  many 
states. 
17 Appendix 
The model described in section III  essuises  that  individuals maximize 
utiliry over  two  consumption goods,  one of which  is  taxable  at the  state 
level,  and leisure.  From the  utility maximization  at  the  individual level, 
demand  functions  for the two goods can be constructed  along with  a  labor 
supply function.  I  then assume that the  state maximizes individual utility 
conditional on  these demand snd supply  functions.  In other  words,  the state 
maximizes the indirect  utility function  of the individual.  I assume that the 
gross wage and the net price of the commodities  (gross  and net of taxes)  are 
fixed but that the net wage and gross price sre affected  by 1) state taxation 
and 2)  federal  deductibility.  For example,  if the gross wsge equals 1,  then 
the net wage, w, will equal 
(2)  w  — P(l-r) 
where r  is the state marginal tax  rate on  wage income,  and P  is the federal 
tax price for state income  taxes.  If  the taxpayer does  not itemize on  the 
federal  return,  then the  cost of a dollar  of stste  taxes equals  one dollar  and 
P  equals 1.  If the  taxpayer  itemizes and deducts  the tax,  then the net cost 
of a dollar of taxes  paid to  the stare government is  1-c  where  is  the 
federal  marginal  tax rate  en  wage income.  In this case,  the net wage (net of 
federal and  state  taxes  and  accounting for  federal  deductibility) equals 
(l-r)(l-r )21 
In s similar  vein,  the gross price of the  taxable  commodity equals its 
net price (assumed  equal  to 1) plus the net sales tax paid to the state (net 
of the  amount deductible  on  the federal return).  If Pis the tax price for 
general sales  taxes,  and t  the  general sales  tax  rate,  then the gross price 
(q)  is given  by 
(3)  q — 1 + Pt 
The state government  chooses a tax rate  on  wage income  (r) end a general 
18 sales  tax rate (t)  to  maximize individual utility.  From the  first order 
conditions for the utility maximization problem, I derive functions  and 
t, the  state's choice of tax rates as  functions of the parameters of the 
model.  The critical parameters that I  consider in  the  text  are  the tax 
exporting  rates  and the federal  tax ptices. 
The Tax Reform  Act of  1986  eliminated deductibility for general sales 
tax rates and lowered  marginal tax rates for most taxpayers.  This latter 
change had  the effect  of raising the federal tax price for state  income 
taxes.  Algebraically,  I characterize  the Tax Reform  Act of  1986 as 
(4)  dl'  >0 
(5)  dl'  — dP 
where 5 can be either positive or negative.  One might first assume  that 
O <  <1,  i.e.  that the tax price for state income taxes  increased but by 
less than the increase for state sales taxes.  For example,  if prior  to 
TRA86,  P—P — .60  then  dP  — .40  and dP  is a number like  .25,  say,  and* 
—  .625.  As  I  noted in Section  ITI,  the sales tax look up tables  likely 
underestimate  the marginal impact of a sales tax payment.  If for example, 
only half the sales tax payments are allowed  as a deduction  using the tables, 
then P  prior to TRA86 equals  .80 rather  than  .60.  In  this  case  dP  —  .20  < 
dl'  — .25  and  — 1.25. 
y 
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20 Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std.  0ev.  Mm  Max 
Personal Income  Tax share  18.329  11.579  0.000  46.396 
General Sales Tax Share  21.922  9.478  0.000  52.553 
Selective  Sales Tax Share  12.202  3.480  6.043  27.820 
Charges share  16.526  7.158  6.706  55.601 
Corp.  Inc.  Tax Share  5.244  2.701  0.000  13.106 
Other Taxes Share  6.703  10.859  0.185  82.758 
Income  Tax Price  91.916  2.004  83.470  98.240 
Sales Tax Price  91.572  3.742  81.590  100.000 
Fraction Itemizers  33.080  7.514  13.260  50.920 
Export  100.019  12.568  72.000  146.000 
Mineral State  0.167  0.373  0.000  1.000 
% Age 18-44  42.336  1.964  36.800  48.200 
% Age 65  +.  11.769  1.828  7.500  17.800 
Change in  Unemp.Rate  0.003  1.395  -4.170  4.660 
General Sales Tax  Rates  4.372  1.086  2.000  7.500 
Sales Tax Base to  CSP (%)  44.342  10.105  24.556  95.122 
There are 432 observations (48  states and 9 years) on all but the last two 
variables.  For those  there are 396  observations (44 states and 9 years). 
See text for definitions  of  variables. 
21 Table  2.  Tax to Income  Regressions 
For each regression,  the dependent  variable is tax collections  as a fraction 
of aggregate personal income.  The regressions  are for  the 48 continental 
states for the  9 year period from fiscal  year 1980 to 198g.  There are 432 
observations. Regressions  include  fixed effects  for the 48 stares.  CFE is a 
Chi-Square  statistic  (6 d.f.)  testing  for correlated  fixed  effects. 
22 
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-  434fl  - .325"  - .074  - . 154"  - .003  - .001 
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.971  .944  .925  .972  .862  .895 
CFE  23.4  11.9  26.5  6.9  15.6  20.5 
P-Value  (0.00)  (0,06)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
- significant at 5% 




sided) Table  3.  General  Sales Tax Rare and Base Regresaions 
Dependent  Vat:  Rate  Ease 
Income  .352  -1.462 
Tax Price  (.073)  (.637) 
Sales  - .106  .668 
Tax Price  (.028)  (.245) 
Exporting  .001  .172 
(.006)  (.053) 
Real Per  .294**  2.422** 
Capita  Income  (.051)  (.439) 
Mineral  .185  2.680 
State  (.168)  (1.459) 
%Age 
- .077  2.337** 
18-44  (.064)  (.559) 
%Age 
- .071  - .530 
65 +  (.059)  (.508) 
Change in  - .057  - .024 
Unemployment  (.036)  (.314) 
Rate 
Trend  .102**  .454 
(.030)  (.260) 
ft2  .405  .483 
* -  significant at 5% level (two sided) 
** -  significant at  1% level  (two sided) 
The dependent variable is the effective sales tax tate or the ratio of the 
implicit tax base to Gross State Product.  The regressions  are for the 
44 continental states with a  general sales tax for  the  9 year petiod from 
1980 to  1988.  There are 396  observations.  All regressions  have  indicator 
variables for nine Census regions and use instrumental  variables for  the tax 
price variables. 
23 Table  4.  Percentile  Regressions 
Personal  Income  Tax Share Regressions 
Percentile  50  75  90  95  99  AVG 
Income 
- .223  .022  -.107  -  .194  -.007  - .781 
Tax Price  (.230)  (.104)  (.049)  (.053)  (.024)  (.189) 
[-1.18]  (.10]  [-.44]  [-.74]  (-.02]  (-3.92] 
Sales  .058  - .006  .012  .012  .001  .114 
Tax Price  (.142)  (.041)  (.017)  (.015)  (.011)  (.058) 
(.03]  (-.03]  [.05]  [.05]  [.003]  [.57] 
ft2  .971  .972  .971  .965  .972  .971 
General  Sales Tax Share Regressions 
Percentile  50  75  90  95  99  AVG 
Income  .214  .478"  -.094  .076  .049  - .281 
Tax Price  (.262)  (.132)  (.056)  (.058)  (.028)  (.215) 
[.94]  [1.90]  [-.32]  [.24]  (.14]  [-1.18] 
Sales  -.291  -.180  -.017  -.025  -.017  -.018 
Tax Price  (.161)  (.053)  (.019)  (.015)  (.013)  (.067) 
[-1.28]  [-.71]  [-.06]  [-.08]  [-.05]  [-.07] 
ft2  .945  .933  .943  .943  .944  .944 
* - significant at 5% level (two sided) 
** -  significant at 1% level (two sided) 
These regressions are  identical to  those in  table  2  except  for  the  change  in 
tax  price  variables.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in  parentheses  and 
elasticities  evaluated  at the means  in brscketa. 
24 Table 5.  Income  Group Regressions 
Dependent  Personal  General  Selective  Charges  &  Corporate  Other 




25  -1.683  -2.390  .470 
- .481  3.2ll*  - .371 
(3.175)  (3.218)  (1.356)  (1.488)  (1.448)  (5204) 
50  l.723**  1.849*  .367  .289  .644  2.955** 
(.760)  (.771)  (325)  (.357)  (.347)  (1.246) 
95  -  376**  - .142  -.007  .015  .040  .281 




25  -1.683  1.601  .132  .219  2.333  - .159 
(2.796)  (2.834)  (1.192)  (1.309)  (1.272)  (4.574) 
50  _1.574*  1.787**  - .438  - .288 
- .447  2.561* 
(.697)  (.706)  (.297)  (.326)  (.317)  (1.140) 
95  .166  .138  .053  .011 
- .002  - .262 
(.089)  (.090)  (.038)  (.041)  (.403)  (.147) 
.948  .920  .895  .970  .807  .843 
These regressions  also include  the variables found in  table  2. 
* -  significant at 5% level (two sided) 
** -  significant  at 1% level (two sided) 
25 EN  DMOT  K  S 
Conceptually,  there is no reason to treat the two types  of exporting 
differently.  It ia useful  to do so though  to emphasize  the influence  of 
federal tax  policy  on atate and local tax policies. 
2 
See,  for example,  Martin  Feldatein and Gilbert Metcalf  (1987),  Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin and Harvey Rosen  (l98i) ,  Lawrence  Lindsey  (1988)  ,  Robert  Inman 
(1989)  and  Mary Cede and Lee Adkins (1990). 
Examples of the average tax price literature  include  many of  the  papers 
cited in footnote  2. 
For the purposes cf this analysis, I  include charges  and licenses in  tax 
collections.  These data come from the  U.S Bureau of  the  Census Stare Tax 
Collections  and are adjusted using  the methodology of John  Due and  John 
Mikesell  (1983).  In  particular, various states  include  cerrain business 
raxes in the general sales rex figures prepared by the Census Bureau.  I 
include  those in the "other"  category.  Taxes on motor vehicle sales as well 
as hotel and meal raxes  are added to the  general sales tax category.  Other 
minor changes  ere made  ro create  a consistent set of series. 
The model is elaborated  more fully in  an  appendix.  Complere details  and 
derivarions  are available  upon request from rhe author. 
6 
Measuring rhe tax price  for  individual stare  taxes  is slighrly more 
complicated in  practice.  I  describe  some  of the complications end  rhe 
methodology  I used for constructing tax prices in the  next section of this 
paper. 
See for example rhe  discussion on page 140 of Reschovsky and Chernick 
(1989) 
8 
Roberr Ehel (1992)  argues that rhis is in facr whar happened. 
Presumably,  direct  policy instruments  would be m  more efficienr  device for 
carrying  out  redistribution  than  this  indirect  approach.  Polirical 
constraints  may preclude  such a direct approach  however. 
10  This date set contains  derailed information  from federal  rax returns for 
anywhere  from 85,000  to 160,000  filers  per year. 
11  See ACIR (1990).  Also see  footnote  12 below. 
12  In 1989,  six arares  allowed deductions for stare  income  taxes but not for 
stare general sales  raxes while one stare (Kentucky)  allowed  a deduction for 
srare general sales taxes bur not for state income  taxes (ACIR,  1990)  .  The 
greater  number  of  states  showing  a  preference  for  the srate  income  tax 
reflects  rhe  tendency  of  state  income  taxes  to  define  their  tax  base 
according  to federal  definirions. 
26 13  An  additional benafit  of  using  TAXSIM  is  tha  ability  to  construct 
instrumental variables  to  control  for  the  endogeneity in  the  tax  price 
variable  noted  above.  Higher  levels  of  state  taxation  increase  the 
probability  of  itemtzing which  in  turn  reduces  the  tax  price  for  that 
particular  tax.  This leads to a negative  correlation  between rhe residual in 
a  tax regression and the  tax  price variable.  Second,  higher  levels of a 
particular tax taken as a deduction may push the taxpayer into a  lower tax 
bracket which increases the tax price and leads to  a positive correlation 
between tax share residuals and the measured tax price.  I  construct three 
instruments  for  the  tax  price using TAXSIM.  A "first  dollar"  tax  price can be 
constructed  by  zeroing  out the deductions reported  by taxpayers  and computing 
a  marginal tax  rate  on  wage  income.  Call  this  r.  I  then  impute  a 
probability  of itemizing to each taxpayer  based on national itemization  rates 
conditional on  the  returns adjusted gross  income and number of dependents. 
Call this p.  Then the first dollar  measure  of  tax price would equal 
P —1-pr 
5  55 
A "last dollar"  tax price instrument  is constructed  as follows.  Instead  of 
zeroing  out tax deductions,  I replace  the  reported  deductions  with the  average 
amount reported nationally by a  taxpayer of  the  conditioning  variables and 
compute the  marginal  tax rate on  wage income.  Call this  r.  The last dollar 
tax price then is 
— 1  - 
p5r5. 
The  third instrument  is p.  Note that I need at least two tax prices,  one for 
the income tax  price and the other for the  sales  tax  price.  The advantage of 
these instruments  is that they control  for both forms  of endogeneity  and can 
be  constructed  mt the  micro level (i.e. for each tax  payer)and aggregated to a 
statewide  level. 
14  Alaska and Hawaii are eliminated from the study to be consistent with 
previous research  in this area.  Hawaii  has a unique  state-local  relationship 
which may make it more similar  to large cities  than to other  states. 
15 
The correlation  is 0.69 over the sample  period during  which the  general 
sales tax is fully deductible. 
16  The retail  sales measure also includes  sales to  industrial,  retail, and 
other business firas so  long as the sale is  a  final sale.  Therefore, a 
high sales  activity  index  may also reflect  exporting  to non-residents  through 
business sales  taxes which may in large part be exported. 
17 
Previous research  by  Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1988)  as well as research on 
municipal debt supply by Metcalf (1991)  suggest the  importance of  correlated 
individual  effects  in  models of state or local  revenue  structure.  State sales 
tax rates change slowly over time and removing the across state variation 
through the  use of firsr difference or fixed effects estimation removes most 
of  the information  in the data.  Adding dummies  for  Census region in those 
regressions  seems  a  reasonable compromise.  I  test  for  correlated  fixed 
effects  in  all  the  fixed  effects regressions and  generally  reject  zero 
correlation  between explanatory  variables (and instruments)  and fixed  effects. 
27 18  Gross State  Product  data are conatructed  by the Bureau  of Economic  Analysis 
(BEA)  and provide a  good measure of economic activity within  the  state. 
However,  the  series is only available  up through  1986.  Pot  the missing two 
years, 1987  and 1988,  I extrapolate  CS? for each of  the SO states  by fitting  a 
regression for each state of  CS? on personal  income and lagged CS?.  This 
simple approach has  the  virtue of fitting the data very well  as well  as 
picking up major turning points  in the data for the  vast majority of the 
states. 
19  .  I am  indebted  to Helen  Ladd for this  idea. 
20  These percentile prices are not highly correlated.  For the  income tax 
price,  the corje1ationsange 
from .005  to  .433 with the maximum correlation 
between the 90  and 95  percentile.  The average  correlation  is  .288. 
21  This measure  is  complicated  by the fact that aome states  allow a deduction 
for federal income  taxes on the  state income  tax.  In this case  the net wage 
equals 1  -  (m(l-r)+r(l-m))/(l-mr). 
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